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Synopsis of Receptive Spirit: German Idealism and the Dynamics of Cultural Transmission 








Receptive Spirit develops the thesis that the notion of self-induced mental activity at the heart of 
German idealism necessitated a radical rethinking of humans’ dependence on culturally transmitted 
models of thought, evaluation, and creativity. The chapters of the book examine paradigmatic 
attempts undertaken by German idealist thinkers to reconcile spontaneous mental activity with 
receptivity to culturally transmitted models. The book maps the ramifications of this problematic in 
Kant’s theory of aesthetic experience, Fichte’s and Hegel’s views on the historical character of 
philosophy, the Fichtean model of philosophical communication, and Friedrich Schlegel’s theory 
and practice of literary communication and criticism. Drawing on Gadamer and McDowell, I argue 
that the conceptual framework established by the Idealists remains indispensable for orientation in 




I outline the stakes of my argument by considering a little-discussed paratext in Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s influential grounding of philosophical hermeneutics: namely, the allegory of receptivity 
in the untitled poem by Rilke from which Gadamer borrows the epigraph to Truth and Method. 
Gadamer’s tendentiously incomplete quotation of the poem dramatizes the tension between 
receptive openness towards an authoritative prior text and the principle of self-determining thought. 
Given that, as I argue, the central motif of the poem can be traced back to the Idealist context, 
Gadamer’s truncated quotation of the poem highlights the tension between the Idealist legacy and 
the receptivity of hermeneutic experience. In order to delineate the conceptual space within which 
my chapters will move, I outline three paradigmatic positions: the Kantian account of knowledge as 
a conjunction of sensible receptivity and spontaneous thought, Hegel’s critique of the presupposition 
of finitude underlying the Kantian model, and Gadamer’s reversal of Hegel in the name of 
hermeneutic experience. 
 
Chapter One: Kant On the Formation of Taste 
Against the backdrop of 18th-century repercussions of the “Quarrel between the Ancients and the 
Moderns,” the chapter clarifies the considerations motivating Kant’s claim that of all faculties taste 
is most strongly dependent upon historically transmitted examples. Central to Kant’s aesthetics is a 
dialectic of nature and culture that entails a complementarity between a model of taste rooted in 
nature, which Kant calls the “ideal of beauty,” and classic works of art. Based on an analysis of 
Kant’s understanding of the “exemplary” necessity of judgments of taste, I argue for the centrality of 
art to Kant’s account of the formation of taste. On this basis, I claim that a rich conception of 
practical criticism can be recovered from Kant’s aesthetics. My argument thus counters a scholarly 
tradition that takes Kant’s claims about the primacy of natural beauty at face value. This alternative 
interpretation of Kant’s aesthetics helps explain its impact on such successors as Friedrich Schlegel, 
Schelling and Hegel, and allows us to locate Kant’s thinking at the juncture of Classicism and 
Romanticism. 
 
Chapter Two: Kantian Revisionism and Revisionist Kantianism 
Although Kant often asserts that philosophy is ahistorical, his recourse in several key passages to the 
overlapping distinctions between letter and spirit and between imitation and emulation suggests 
otherwise. In fact, Kant’s claim that one may understand an author better than he understood himself 
furnished Kant’s successors with a hermeneutic justification for presenting genuinely new 
conceptions as explications of insights that had remained implicit in Kant’s works. As a result, the 
idealist reception of Kant is characterized by a tension between indebtedness and departure. 
 
Chapter Three: Esoteric Enlightenment in Fichte 
Endemic to the Enlightenment project is a pedagogical quandary identified by Rousseau, Diderot, 
and Hamann: how can independent thought be induced from outside, by another? This difficulty is 
exacerbated by the consequences of Kant’s claim that insight into the metaphysical character of the 
subject requires an exercise of moral freedom. In the experiment of self-construction that Fichte’s 
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readers are urged to perform, the foundational role of freedom opens up an abyss of 
incomprehension between the dogmatic standpoint of ordinary consciousness and the standpoint of 
transcendental idealism. By examining Fichte’s reflections on his authorial stance, I argue that his 
understanding of philosophical practice results in a form of esotericism. 
 
Chapter Four: Friedrich Schlegel On Textual Communication 
The aspiration to avoid Fichtean esotericism was central to Friedrich Schlegel’s work in his early 
Romantic period. Responding to Fichte, Schlegel outlines a dynamic model of interaction that 
affirms the indeterminacy of writing and moves between the extremes of transformative reception 
and free construction. In this model, the author aims at transforming his reader, who in her turn is 
invested with the freedom to understand the author better than he himself. Schlegel’s vision of 
critical reading turns on the imperative of “constructing” the form of confusion peculiar to an author. 
The chapter argues that literary criticism as envisioned by Schlegel makes inferences regarding the 
author secondary to consideration of the work, yet remains sensitive to the author’s individuality. 
The relevant dimension of individuality is, however, articulated in language and so not accessible 
through psychological conjectures. 
 
Chapter Five: Exoteric Enlightenment in Hegel 
Schlegel’s response to Fichte decided the ancient contest between “Socratic” dialogism and a 
monological, “Platonic” dialectics in favor of the former. Countering the reductive view of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit as an instance of monological dialectics, I construe the Phenomenology as 
an attempt at avoiding both Fichtean esotericism and the Schlegelian celebration of dialogical open-
endedness. Crucial to Hegel’s exoteric introduction to speculative insight is his conception of 
language as a medium of the dialectic of self-recognition and self-estrangement that drives the 
education of Spirit. The project of the Phenomenology is undoubtedly monological inasmuch as it is 
underwritten by the authoritative standpoint of absolute knowledge, which recognizes no external 
constraint on the activity of Spirit. The actualization of this project nevertheless requires Spirit to 
remain receptive towards the diverse linguistic forms characteristic of its earlier, alienated shapes. 
 
Conclusion: The Afterlife of a Distinction 
The preceding chapters have shown that the Kantian duality of receptivity and spontaneity recurs in 
post-Kantian idealists’ reflections on cultural transmission. In view of this persistence, it is 
necessary to ask if the Kantian duality still remains relevant to the contemporary situation. I address 
this question by examining John McDowell’s recent revival of Kantian and Hegelian insights, and in 
particular the idea of second nature that underwrites McDowell’s attempted reconciliation of 
spontaneity with the culturally transmitted character of the norms constitutive of thought. This 
reconciliation raises the question of why McDowell stops short of doing away with the very 
distinction between spontaneity and receptivity. I argue that an abandonment of the Kantian 
distinction is precluded by the modern predicament, which is defined by an inevitably conflicted 
stance towards the cultural past.	 
 
